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Abstract. This study aims to analyze the moderating effect of auditor characteristics on the relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and earnings management. Mechanisms of good corporate governance can limit and control the 
opportunistic actions of management. A highly effective audit committee will reduce the prevalence of earnings management. 
In addition to the audit committee as an internal party that oversees the credibility of financial statements, it is also necessary 
to supervise external parties, through the use of external auditors. With expectations of reducing earnings manipulation, this 
study examines the effects of the combination of an effective audit committee and an independent auditor. The research 
sample selection uses a purposive judgmental non-probability sampling technique. The sample obtained is 754 firm years, 
consisting of three years of company observations in the Indonesian capital market between 2016 and 2018, except those in 
the financial sector. Earnings management is measured by accrual value using a modified Jones model. The independent 
variable of the study is the effectiveness of the audit committee (EFAC) which will be assessed using the DeZoort index. The 
results of the empirical testing support the research hypothesis; the more effective the audit committee is and the longer the 
external audit period is, the more prevalent earnings management will be. In addition, the more effective the audit committee 
is, coupled with the use of one of the big four auditors, the less prevalent earnings management will be, which means the 
auditor's reputation also strengthens the relationship between the effectiveness of the audit committee and earnings 
management. Further, the moderating effect of auditor specialization on the influence of the audit committee on earnings 
manipulation did not provide significant results. 
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1. Introduction 
There are two main causes of corporate governance issues (Zgarni, Hlioui & Zehri, 2016). First, strong 
stakeholder pressure, rapid technological change and ever-changing environmental and social culture promotes 
good governance and demand transparency of financial reporting. Second, financial reporting issues in a number 
of companies trigger a decline in confidence in the accuracy of the information provided and adversely affect the 
behavior of stakeholders. Recently, in Indonesia, an accounting firm called Satrio Bing Eny & Partners (KAP 
SBE), which is an affiliate of Deloitte in Indonesia, experienced difficulty with the auditing process. Both public 
accountants from SBE's public accountant office, Malinna and Merliyana Syamsul, received administrative 
sanctions from the OJK. Based on a decision from the Center for Financial Professional Development (P2PK), 
both of them are unable to provide audit services to financial service entities for a period of one year. Sanctions 
given to SBE public accounting firms include the prohibition on the addition of new clients in the financial 
services sector (CNBC Indonesia, 2018).  
 
In agency theory, information asymmetry triggers earnings management practices. Information asymmetry is a 
condition of information disparity between management and shareholders. The management, as the managers of 
the company, have access to more information, particularly in relation to the company’s financial affairs, than the 
shareholders (Christiani & Nugrahanti, 2014). The data contained in financial statements can be manipulated by 
choosing certain accounting policies or arranging transactions to appear different from the actual conditions; this 
is also referred to as earnings management, the ultimate goal of which can mislead readers of financial statements 
about the company’s performance (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Good governance can control and regulate a 
company to create added value for each stakeholder. According to Inaam and Khamoussi (2016), the function of 
the governance mechanism in financial reporting is to ensure consistency between maintaining the credibility and 
reliability of a company's financial statements with financial accounting standards. Specifically, this study 
analyzes audit committees as part of corporate governance. Halim (2015) shows that the audit committee can 
reinforce the relationship between independent auditors and management. High quality audits conducted by 
external auditors and audit committees encourage a high quality of earnings (Becker et. al., 1998). The higher the 
effectiveness of the audit committee, the less prevalent earnings management will be (Abbott, Park, & Parker, 
2000). 
 
This paper enriches the existing literature, both theoretically and empirically, concerning the impact of audit 
committee characteristics on earnings management. Theoretically, it will expand on the agency theory and 
governance in improving the quality of financial reporting. Empirically, the results of research on interactions 
between audit committees and external auditors on the quality of reporting have been carried out in countries with 
advanced capital markets. Conversely, studies in countries with developing capital markets are still rare. 
 
This paper consists of several sections. The previous section explained the background, objectives, and research 
contributions. The second section provides theories and logical thinking about developing research hypotheses. 
The research methods and models are contained in part three followed by the empirical results in part four. A 
discussion and critical evaluation with a consideration of previous findings is presented in the fifth section and the 
last section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review          
Agency theory and corporate governance are used in this study as a theoretical framework to investigate the 
preferences of managers in companies. The role of the audit committee and the characteristics of the auditor can 
be explained using this theory. It recognizes this as the most critical oversight mechanism that can reduce agency 
costs, manage conflicts of interest, and reduce earnings management. Audit committees and external auditors, as 
corporate governance actors, provide supervision that is expected to reduce the potential for earnings 
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management. Agency theory predicts that supervision ensures the quality of financial reporting (Zgarni et. al., 
2016). 
 
The big four public accounting firms are often assumed to have better audit quality, because they have an 
international reputation, have large clients, and use sophisticated technology in their activities. The interaction 
between the audit committee and the external auditor is related to the honesty and objectivity of the auditor, 
thereby reducing earnings management. The audit committee and external auditor aim to publish high-quality 
reports so they can carry out high-quality audits to maintain their reputation and avoid legal liability. Hence, it can 
be said that the audit committee and the use of external auditors can reduce agency problems and thereby reduce 
the prevalence of earnings management practices. 
 
H1: The more effective the audit committee and the use of reputable external auditors, the less prevalent earnings 
management will be. 
 
Mutmainnah and Wardhani (2013) suggest that auditors specializing in industrial practices tend to be more 
solution-oriented and responsive in carrying out audit procedures. Extensive experience and working hours I the 
relevant field will help the audit committee to conduct and advance the quality of supervision and control of 
financial statements. Zgarni et. al. (2016) show that companies that have an effective audit committee and 
industry specialization auditors can reduce earnings management. This is because there is a complementary 
relationship between the effectiveness of audit committees and industry specialization auditors in limiting 
earnings management practices. 
 
H2: The more effective the audit committee, coupled with the use of specialized external auditors, the less 
prevalent earnings management will be. 
 
The moderation effect of the audit committee and independent auditors can increase with the length of the audit 
period. This is because more effective audit committees tend to retain their auditors as long as the auditor can 
provide high-quality financial reporting (Meixner & Welker, 1988). According to Fitriany, Utama, Martani and 
Rosietta (2016), the longer an auditor remains engaged by a company, the more competent the auditor will be, 
because the auditor will obtain greater knowledge about the company’s specific risks and its internal control 
systems.  
 
H3: The more effective the audit committee and the longer the audit tenure, the less prevalent earnings 
management will be. 
  
3. Research Methodology 
 
The research sample selection uses a purposive judgmental non-probability sampling technique. The sample 
obtained was 754 years of the company, consisting of three years of observation between 2016 and 2018. The 
data used came from the audited financial statements and annual reports. Data can be obtained from the 
Indonesian capital market website or company website. The total sample has complete data and consists of all 
industries, except the financial sector, which has specific regulations. 
3.1 Measurement of Variables 
The dependent variable of this study is earnings management which is proxied by discretionary accrual (DAC), 
measured using the Modified Jones Model on a cross-sectional basis according to Dechow et. al. (1995). The 
discretionary accrual calculation using the Modified Jones Model is as follows: 
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a. Total accruals (TA) calculated using a formula: 
 
 
 
b. Non-discretionary accruals calculated using a formula: 
 
 
 
c. Discretionary accruals calculated using a formula: 
 
(3) 
 
The independent variables in this study are the effectiveness of the audit committee and audit quality. The 
measurement of the effectiveness of the audit committee refers to the research of DeZoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault and Reed (2002), while the measurement of audit quality refers to the research of Zgarni et. al. 
(2016). 
3.2 Audit Committee Effectiveness (ACEff)  
Audit committee effectiveness is measured by the total score of the audit committee effectiveness index by 
reference to DeZoort et. al. (2002) with a maximum score of 14. The four dimensions that determine the 
effectiveness of the audit committee are (table 1): 
 
Table 1. Audit Committee Effectiveness Index 
 
Dimension Code Proxy Skoring 
Composition ACIND Audit Committee Independence 
All members of the audit committee must come from 
outside the company or independent parties 
1;0 
ACEXP Audit committee Expertise 
At least one member has a background in accounting 
or finance 
1;0 
Authority ACCHART Audit Committee Charter 
Proxy statement regarding the audit committee 
agreement (work program) 
1;0 
ACDUTY Audit Committee Responsibility 
If the company writes in detail about the duties and 
responsibilities of the audit committee on financial 
information, it is given a score of 2. If the company 
writes a brief statement about the review conducted by 
the audit committee on the company's financial 
information, it is given a score of 1. If there is no 
2;1;0 
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disclosure, then given a score of 0. 
Resources ACSIZE Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee has a minimum of 3 members 
1;0 
Diligence ACMEET Audit Committee Meeting 
The audit committee meeting at least 4 times a year 
1;0 
 ACVOLDIS Audit Committee Voluntary Disclosure 
The audit committee voluntarily discloses more 
financial information than other regulations or 
companies 
1;0 
 
The measurement of audit characteristics is by reference to Zgarni et. al. (2016) using three proxies. First, the 
auditor's reputation (REPUT) is given a score of 1 if the company is audited by one of the Big Four Public 
Accounting Firm and 0 if it is audited by a Non-Big Four Public Accounting Firm. Second, specialization of the 
auditor industry (SPEC), if the company being audited with a market share of more than 10%, then it is worth 1 
and if less than 10% will be worth 0. The total sales of clients audited by KAP in the industry are divided by total 
sales in the industry. Third, the audit period (TENURE) is the number of consecutive years the client maintains 
the KAP. The number of tenure years is counted backward, starting from year t (research year) and traced to the 
year the client moves to another auditor. 
3.3 Regression Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAC, Discretionary accruals at the company i for years t. ACEffit. The effectiveness of the audit committee is 
measured using the Dezoort index. REPUT, auditor's reputation (1 if audited by a Big Four public accountant and 
0 if not). SPEC, Specialization of auditor industry. TENURE, length of the audit engagement. ACEff x REPUT, 
Interaction between the effectiveness of the audit committee and the auditor's reputation. ACEff x SPEC, 
Interaction between the effectiveness of the audit committee and the auditor's specialization. ACEff x TENURE, 
Interaction between the effectiveness of the audit committee and the audit period. SIZE, company size (Ln of total 
assets). LEV, Leverage (total debt divided by total assets). MTB, market to book ratio (share market value divided 
by book value of equity). ROA, return on assets (net profit divided by total assets).  
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4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
The descriptive statistics for the 754 company years in the sample are presented in Table 2. The average absolute 
DAC is 4.11% of total assets, with a standard deviation of 0.17. TENURE has a value minimum and maximum of 
1 and 20. Frequency statistical results show that Big Four auditors represent 27.6% of the sample companies, 
while companies audited by non-Big 4 audit firms represent less than 72.4% of the sample. In addition, the overall 
industry specialization (SEPC) average was 28.4%. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Min Max Mean SD 
DACit -1,0113 1,5768 -0,0411 0,1771 
ACEff 1 14 9,28 2,5040 
TENURE 1 20 6,66 5,2340 
ACEff x REPUT 0,00 14,00 3,0557 5,0600 
ACEff x SPEC 0,00 14,00 3,0822 5,0409 
ACEff x TENURE 1 252 65.0013 58,7541 
FSIZE 9,9753 14,7541 12,4030 0,7145 
LEV 0,00006 22.6105 0,5391 1,0019 
MTB -7,1200 26,2000 1,9554 2,6224 
ROA -1,0099 2,1920 0,0285 0,1376 
n = 754     
 
4.2 Results of the Regressions  
The results of the coefficient of determination are presented in Table 3. Models 1, 2, and 3 in this study show an 
adjusted R2 value of 0.384, 0.383, and 0.395. Table 3 also shows that the independent variable has a significant 
simultaneous effect on DACit because the significance value is below 0.05 or 5%. For model 1, 2 and 3, the F test 
results were 68.150, 67.833, and 71.183 with a significance value of 0.000. The coefficient of the interaction 
variable between audit effectiveness and the auditor's reputation (ACEff × REPUT) is negative and significant. 
These results support H1, which is that a higher audit committee effectiveness, and the presence of Big Four 
auditors will reduce earnings management. The effectiveness score of the audit committee and auditor specialist 
(ACEff × SPEC) is not significant meaning H2 is not supported. The coefficient of the interaction variable 
between audit effectiveness and the auditor's tenure (ACEff × TENURE) is negative and significant meaning H3 
is supported. 
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Table 3. Regression Results (Audit Committee and Earning Management) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
t Sig. t Sig. t Sig. 
Constant -2,153** 0,016 -2.301** 0,011 -2.846*** 0,003 
ACEff -0,562 0,287 -0.560 0,287 1.986** 0,023 
REPUT 1,539* 0,062     
SPEC   1.144 0,126   
TENURE     3.946*** 0,000 
ACEff x 
REPUT 
-1,337* 0,090 
    
ACEff x SPEC   -0.988 0,162   
ACEff x 
TENURE 
    
-3.656*** 0,00 
FSIZE 1,638* 0,051 1.789** 0,037 1.422* 0,078 
LEV -1,072 0,142 -1.069 0,142 -1.156 0,124 
MTB -3,849*** 0,000 -3.941*** 0.00 -4.083*** 0.00 
ROA 21,056*** 0,000 21,155*** 0,00 21,274*** 0,00 
F 68,150*** 67,833*** 71,183*** 
n 745 
Adj. R2 0,384 0,383 0,395 
* Significant level 0.1; ** Significant level 0.05; *** Significant level 0.01 
 
5. Discussion 
The relationship between ACEff x REPUT and DAC in the tables above shows that there is a significant and 
negative effect. This indicates that hypothesis 1 is accepted, which means that the more effective the audit 
committee is, coupled with the use of a big four auditor, the less prevalent earnings management will be. This is 
consistent with the study of Alves (2013) which shows that the interaction between the effectiveness of the audit 
committee and the use of a big four auditor has a significant negative effect on earnings management. Rahmadani 
and Haryanto (2018) also found that the use of the big four external auditors had a significant negative effect on 
earnings management. Big four auditors have better incentives to detect and disclose reporting errors made by 
management. Big four auditors are more at risk when an audit failure occurs, so that the big four auditor can more 
effectively monitor the auditee. The audit committee has a close relationship with external auditors. The audit 
committee and external auditor have obligation to publish high quality financial statements. The oversight 
mechanism by the audit committee or external auditor cannot be carried out independently and separately because 
supervision they provide is a unity in the corporate governance structure. 
 
The results in the tables above show that ACEff x SPEC has no significant relationship to DACit. This indicates 
that hypothesis 2 is rejected, which means that the effectiveness of the audit committee and the use of specialist 
auditors do not have a significant effect on earnings management. These results contradict previous studies, such 
as Zgarni et. al. (2016), which concludes that the complementary relationship between the effectiveness of the 
audit committee and auditor specialists will lower the prevalence of earnings management. The inability of 
auditor specialization to reduce the level of earnings management in the Indonesian stock market is perhaps 
because specialization is still in the initial stages in Indonesia. Further, only a small number of companies are 
audited by specialized auditors. The results of this study are in line with Dian and Yuyetta (2013), which states 
that auditors who are specialized in specific industries have no significant effect on earnings management. This 
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might be due to weak law enforcement in Indonesia, which makes auditors less able to develop the ability to 
detect earnings management practices. Auditors who are specific to certain industries and those not specific to 
certain industries have not been able to detect earnings management because the object of manipulation is not a 
financial report, but a process of reducing discretionary costs. This research is also in line with Fung, Gul and 
Krishnan (2012), which states that auditors who have experience and expertise are not necessarily independent 
and objective because they tend to retain their clients. Hence, it can be concluded that the ACEff and SPEC 
variables respectively do not have a significant effect on earnings management, and if the ACEff variable is 
modulated with SPEC, this also does not have a significant effect on earnings management. 
 
Table 3 shows that ACEff x TENURE has a significant effect on DACit. This indicates that hypothesis 3 is 
accepted, which means the more effective the audit committee is, and the longer the external audit period, the less 
prevalent earnings management will be. This result is in line with Inaam and Khamoussi (2016), who state that an 
effective audit committee and a long audit period can reduce earnings management. Meixner and Welker (1988) 
suggest that interactions between audit committees and external auditors can increase with increasing audit 
periods (tenure) because more effective audit committees tend to retain auditors as long as the auditor can provide 
high-quality financial reporting. Further, Fitriany et. al. (2016) suggest that the longer the audit period, the more 
competent an auditor will be because they are able to achieve a deeper understanding of the company’s internal 
controls, accounting information systems, and company-specific risks. This is also supported by Gul, Jaggi and 
Krishnan (2007), who state that auditors who do not have a deep understanding of clients will tend to depend on 
estimates and information provided by client companies. Audit quality and tenure have a non-linear or quadratic 
relationship, so that when it reaches its’ optimal point, the independence of the auditor will decrease which will 
affect the auditor's relationship with the client, and will ultimately result in decreased audit quality. In the early 
years of audit assignments, there are many audit errors meaning that a longer audit period will result in better 
audit quality. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study examines the effect of auditor characteristics on the relationship between audit 
committee effectiveness and earnings management practices in Indonesian companies. Acknowledging that 
Indonesia has an environment with different characteristics and regulations for company operations compared to 
other countries, this justifies an investigation of the problem in the Indonesian context. This study contributes to 
agency theory, enriching our understanding of how to effectively reduce agency costs by forming audit 
committees in Asian countries such as Indonesia. Countries with inadequate legal protection such as Indonesia 
will need more effective audit committees than countries with good legal protection. 
 
The empirical results support the agency theory and corporate governance theory. The relationship between the 
audit committee and the quality of the external audit, which is an important mechanism of corporate governance, 
can reduce the manipulation of financial statements. The increased effectiveness of the audit committee and the 
high quality of auditors, which is characterized by the Big Four auditor, will be able to mitigate the possibility of 
earnings management. The effectiveness of the audit committee and the length of the audit work period can also 
reduce earnings management. However, specialist auditors and audit committee effectiveness cannot reduce 
earnings manipulation. 
 
This study has some limitations. First, this research cannot be generalized to the entire world, particularly for 
developed countries. The results of the study may illustrate the condition of states with diffuse or no pyramid 
ownership, low investor protection, family ownership is common, and weak dependence on public debt. In 
addition, managers in developed countries often use more complex techniques, which are less likely to be 
captured with the accrual model in this study, thus making information for investors more opaque. 
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Secondly, earnings manipulation will be able to eliminate or reduce the ability of the cross-sectional expectation 
accrual model to detect earnings management actions. Third, estimates and choices of accounting policies are 
usually decided to signal private information. The use of one model to measure earnings management is subject to 
criticism. 
 
Future research may wish to include aspects or other measures of earnings quality, such as actual earnings 
management or income smoothing. Further, it is also recommended that other measures of good corporate 
governance be used in future research. Other considerations include politically connected variables in the 
selection of company CEOs and state governments, as well as the role of audit committees in organizations with 
political connections in Indonesia.            
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